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We consider a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent and ef-
fortthatistwo-dimensional. Onedimensionoftheagent’seffortisobservableand
the otheris not. The principalcan thusmake the contract conditional not only on
outcome but also on observable effort. The principal’s optimal contract gives the
agent no rent and– in contrast to the ﬁrst-best allocation – uses too much observ-
able effort and too little unobservable effort. This distortion in the relative use of
the two kinds of effort increases if the agent’s liability becomes more limited.
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11. Introduction
Consider a principal-agent relationship with moral hazard. There will probably be
many actions that the agent can take to further the principal’s project. Some of these
actions will be observable, some not. In the following, we will subsumeall actions that
are observable under the term observable effort, and all actions that are not observ-
able under the term unobservable effort. In the ﬁrst-best, without moral hazard, the
optimalmix of efforts will in general include a mix of both kindsof effort. The contract
that is usually assumed in situations of moral hazard is conditional on the observed
outcome only. In this paper we will look at a contract that is also conditional on the
level of observable effort. This means that the contract will stipulate a speciﬁc level
of observable effort and the principal will only pay if he observes at least this level of
observable effort.
Our main interest in this paper is the level of the contractuallyspeciﬁed observable ef-
fort and its relation to the induced level of unobservable effort. We assume that there
is no direct interaction between the costs or returns of the two kinds of effort; never-
theless, the limitedliabilityof the agent will inﬂuence the levels of both kinds of effort.
Moral hazard problems with limited liability of the agent usually have the following
outcome: if the principal cannot extract the whole surplus at the ﬁrst-best level of ef-
fort, he will lower the implementedeffort below theﬁrst-best level.1 In contrast,in our
model the speciﬁed level of observable effort will be above the ﬁrst-best level, while
unobservable effort will be below the ﬁrst-best level. This also means that the combi-
nationofobservableandunobservableeffortwillnotbecost-minimizing,i.e.thegiven
amountof totaleffort isproduced with toomuch observableeffort andtoolittleunob-
servable effort. In other words, the agent would be able to produce the same level of
total effort with lower costs.
For an application, think about a situation where the principal wants the agent to un-
dertakeaprojectthatcanfail withcatastrophicconsequences. Consideragovernment
that licenses a ﬁrm to operate an hazardous technology, like a chemical factory or a
nuclear reactor. The government wants the ﬁrm to undertake effort that increases the
probability that the ﬁrm operates safely. Some of this effort, like the compliance with
technical regulations for the construction of the plant, or the education level of the
operating personnel can be controlled rather easily. But other elements essential to
safe operation will be very hard to observe, like the workload and alertness of the per-
sonnel or whether the ﬁrm’s management exerts pressure on them to “bend the rules”.
The “regulatory contract” in such situations usually includes both standards for ob-
1This may or may not imply a rent for the agent.
2servable effort (“regulation”) and monetary payments that depend on the outcome of
the project (“ﬁnes” and “liability”). The compliance with the standardscan and will be
enforcedex-ante,whiletheex-postpaymentsgivetheﬁrmincentivestoundertakeun-
observable effort. A similar problem exists if a big ﬁrm subcontracts part of a project
to a small ﬁrm. If the small ﬁrm produces bad quality, the damage for the big ﬁrm
might be immense. Contractual arrangements in such situations will usually not only
include payments that are conditional on ﬁnal outcomes but will also authorise the
big ﬁrm to monitor whether the work of the small ﬁrm is in compliance with contrac-
tual standards. In addition, the big ﬁrm might demand that the small ﬁrm will have its
operations “certiﬁed” by a third party.
Our resultssuggestthat insuch situationstheprincipalwill set standardsthatdemand
observable effort which is above the ﬁrst-best level, while the level of unobservable ef-
fort will be below the ﬁrst-best. For example, the work of a small subcontractor will
be more oriented toward observable effort compared to the case where the big ﬁrm
would do the work itself. To generalize, we suggest a possible inefﬁciency existing un-
der moral hazard with limited liability, which does not lie in the amount of total effort
but in the way this effort is produced. This inefﬁciency has seen scant attention in
theory but is often complained about in practice.
Many employees of big organizations complain about “bureaucracy”. They feel that
their work is inefﬁciently organized – it would be more productive if there were fewer
regulations to observe and more time could be spend on doing “real work”. Regula-
tory regimes for hazardous activities are criticized for putting too much emphasis on
compliance with technical standards rather than on soft factors like “safety culture”.
And many observers question whether a ﬁrm’s decision to seek certiﬁcation for use of
a “quality management systems” is mainly motivated by customer pressure, while the
real effect on quality is questionable.2
This work is related to a number of papers which all exploit a similar effect: if the solu-
tion to the moral hazard problem calls for granting the agent a rent, the principal will
try to expropriate this rent by forcing the agent to undertake some other activity that
beneﬁts the principal. This activity might be socially inefﬁcient, but because its costs
come out of the agent’s rent, it is still advantageous for the principal to implement
it. The activity in question might be another principal-agent project (Laux, 2001), re-
porting activities like “paperwork” (Strausz, 2006) or the effort in a preceding period
2The question whether ﬁrms introducing ISO 9000 quality management systems are mainly moti-
vated by external reasons (customer pressure etc.) or by internal reasons (concern for quality and cost
improvements) has been the subject of numerous studies, which have come to conﬂicting results. An
overview ofprevious studies canbefound inHerasSaizarbitoriaet al.(2006); the Delphistudy described
in their paper ﬁndsthat external reasons aredominating. Ina similar vein, Buttle (1997) describes asur-
vey of ISO 9000 certiﬁed ﬁrms; the highest scoring motivation for certiﬁcation is “anticipated demand
from future customers for ISO 9000”.
3of the principal-agent relationship(Kräkel and Schöttner, 2010). Our model is the ﬁrst
that applies this effect to the choice between observable effort and unobservable ef-
fort. This setting is not only of great practical importance,it does also allow for a sharp
characterizationofthetrade-offthatisresponsiblefortheimplementationofasocially
inefﬁcient activity.
In the “Law & Economics” literature, Bhole and Wagner (2008) analyze a setting where
aﬁrmcantakeobservableeffort aswell asunobservableefforttopreventanaccident.3
They ﬁnd that in many situations only the combined use of both liability and regula-
tion will lead to optimal levels of effort in both dimensions. There are two important
differences to our approach. First, in a tort law setting the principal has a different
objective function (total welfare) and usually a restricted choice of policy measures.
Second, Bhole and Wagner only consider a binary choice of observable effort; because
in their model a high level of observable effort is ﬁrst-best, the question of excessive
regulationof observable effort is ruled out by assumption.
Multi-dimensional effort has been studied in number of other settings in the litera-
ture. In the most prominent treatment by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), different
dimensions of effort interact through the agent’s cost function. In our model, there
is no such interaction; observable effort and unobservable effort inﬂuence each other
only because of the shared limited liabilityconstraint.
Therestofthepaperisstructuredasfollows: Section2.setsupthemodel. Insection3.,
we discuss a benchmark case, namely a contract that is conditional on outcome only.
The main part of the paper is section 4., which analyzes a contract that does also regu-
late the agents effort, while section 5. concludes. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2. Setup of the Model
Therearetwokindsofeffort, observableefforto ∈[0,omax]andunobservableeffortu ∈
[0,umax]withomax,umax >0andomax+umax ≤1. Theagent’sprojecthastwooutcomes,
it can either succeed or fail, s ∈{0,1}. The probability of success (s =1) depends on the
agents effort and is given by p(o,u) =o+u. At times we will denote this probability as
total effort. If the agent exerts effort, he suffers costs of co(o)+cu(u). Note that under
this setup there is no direct interaction between the two kinds of effort: the level of
one kind of effort does not inﬂuence the marginal cost or the marginal return of the
3In an article on liability for nuclear accidents, Trebilcock and Winter (1997) sketch a tort-law model
with observable and unobservable effort but do not fully solve it.
4other kind of effort.4 We further need the following technical assumptions for the cost
functions:
Assumption 1. co(o) and cu(u) are continuous, three times differentiable, strictly in-









Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure that the agent’s problem has an interior solution, while
Assumption 4 makes the principal’s problem concave (the condition on c′′′
o (o) is only
needed for the benchmark case).
The beneﬁt for the principal if the project succeeds is set to B > 0. Both parties are
riskneutral. To induceeffort, theprincipalwill writea contract thatspeciﬁes atransfer
scheme t(s,o) that can depend on the outcome of the project and the observed effort.
The agent faces a liability limit L ≥ 0, which can either be interpreted as the maxi-
mum ﬁne that can be imposed on the agent ex-post, or the maximum bond that can
be posted by the agent ex-ante.5 This liability limit is expressed by:
Assumption6. t(s,o)≥−L ∀s ∈{0,1},o ∈[0,omax].
We have to distinguish two concepts. On the one hand, we have the socially optimal
ﬁrst-best effort levels o∗ and u∗, which are given by c′
o(o∗)= B and c′
u(u∗) =B. On the
other hand, for a given level of total effort p, we can ﬁnd the least expensive combi-
nationof observableand unobservableeffort thatproduces p. Such a cost-minimizing
combinationofeffortswill becharacterizedbyc′
o(o)=c′
u(u).6 It iseasy tosee thatﬁrst-
best effort levels are also a cost-minimizing combination of efforts, but that there are
also many other cost-minimizingcombinationsof efforts that are not ﬁrst-best.
4Inrealitythosedirectinteractionwilloftenexist, makingthetwokindsofeffortseither complements
or substitutes. In this paper, we assume no direct interaction to isolate those effects that are due to
limited liability.
5We assume that the liability limit does not depend on the level of efforts.
6This condition results from min
o,u
co(o)+cu(u), subject to p(o,u) = p. Formally, the marginal rate of
technicalsubstitution betweenthese twokindsofeffortmustbeequaltotheratioofrespectivemarginal
costs.
53. Benchmark Case: Incentives only
Toestablisha benchmarkcase, we will ﬁrst consider a contract thatconditionsonly on
outcome. This contract can be described by the transfer scheme:
t(s,o)=
 
b+w if s =1
w if s =0
It hasthe usualpropertythattheprincipalsetsa base wage w anda bonusb. It follows
that the proﬁt function of the principal is given by Π(o,u,b,w) = (B −b) p(o,u)−w,
while the payoff functionof the agent isV (o,u,b,w)=bp(o,u)+w −co(o)−cu(u). The











Thefact thatu isunobservabledoesnot necessarilymeanthattheﬁrst-bestwill notbe
implemented. In fact, if the principal sets b = B, the agent will deliver effort levels o∗
andu∗. Thewagew∗ thatextractsalltheagent’ssurplusisthengivenbyV(o∗,u∗,B,w∗)=
0, which can be written as w∗ =co(o∗)−cu(u∗)−Bp(o∗,u∗).
But this extraction of surplus is feasible only if w∗ ≥ −L; in this case, the principal
can “sell the project” to the agent. If w∗ < −L, the principal faces a tradeoff between
incentivizing effort and extracting rent. In the following, we will always assume that
the ﬁrst-best will not be implemented,namely
Assumption7. w∗ <−L.
We will ﬁnd the optimal effort levels obm and ubm by using the so-called ﬁrst-order
approach. The following proposition shows that this approach is valid in our setting
because the agent’s optimal choice of effort levels is at a stationarypoint.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution to (1) has b > 0 and obm,ubm will be given by the
agent’sﬁrst-orderorderconditionsb−c′
o(o)=0andb−c′
u(u)=0,withobm ∈(0,omax), ubm ∈
(0,umax) and total effort p(o,u)>0.
6We can therefore replace the incentive constraint with the agent’s ﬁrst-order condi-
tions. Additionally,because b >0, one of thelimitedliabilityconstraints, w+b ≥−L, is
superﬂuous. The Lagrangianfor the principal’s problem can now be written as:
L(o,u,b,w,λ,η,µo,µu)=















In the optimal solution, the limited liability constraint w ≥ −L will always be binding,
while the participationconstraint may be binding or not.









with 0≤λ<1. If the agent will get a rent, we have λ=0.
The optimal contract can be found be trying out two cases. In the ﬁrst case with λ=0,
the optimal effort levels are given by the trade-off between the costs of incentives and
the principal’s beneﬁt from having more effort, ignoringthe PC (this will usually mean
arent for theagent). Butifthoseeffortlevelsand w =−L donot satisfythePC, we have
the case λ>0. The principal sets w =−L and chooses the unique level of b that makes
the PC binding. This will mean higher effort levels thanin the ﬁrst case and no rent for
the agent.7
In both cases we will have c′
o(obm) = c′
u(ubm) = b < B. This implies that both kinds of
effort are below the ﬁrst-best level (obm < o∗ and ubm < u∗ ), but because c′
o(obm) =
c′
u(ubm), they form a cost-minimizing combination.
4. Joint Use of Incentives and Standards
We now look at a contract that makes the principal’s payments conditional not only
on outcome, but also on observable effort. At ﬁrst glance the problem of ﬁnding the
optimal contract looks quite simple: set the observable effort to o∗ and optimize over
u (because we assume p(o,u) = o +u, there is no interaction between the two kinds
of effort). But it will turn out that the optimal contract will have a level of observable
effort that is above o∗.
7Which case obtains depends on the severity of the liability limit. Deﬁne L∗ by V (o∗,u∗,B,−L∗) = 0
and ˜ L by V (obm,ubm,B,−˜ L) = 0 (where obm and ubm are given by (3) with λ = 0). If 0 ≤ L < ˜ L the agent
gets a rent, if ˜ L ≤L <L∗ there will be no rent.





b+w if s =1and o ≥o
w if s =0and o ≥o
−L if o <o
where o is contractually speciﬁed level of observable care. The principal’s expected
proﬁt is given by
Πo(o,u,b,w)=
 
(B −b) p(o,u)−w if o ≥o
B  p(o,u)+L if o <o
while the agent’s payoff has the form:
Vo(o,u,b,w)=
 
bp(o,u)+w −co(o)−cu(u) if o ≥o
−L−co(o)−cu(u) if o <o











Denote by ˆ o and ˆ u the effort levels that are implemented in the optimum. The ﬁrst
problem is again to show that the ﬁrst-order approach is valid here.
Proposition 3. The optimal solution to (4) has ˆ o = o and b > 0. Effort level ˆ u will
be given by the agent’s ﬁrst-order order condition b −c′
u(u) = 0, with ˆ o ∈ (0,omax), ˆ u ∈
(0,umax) and total effort p(ˆ o, ˆ u)>0.
Wecanagainusetheagent’sﬁrstorderconditionforuandignoretheconstraint w+b≥
0. The Lagrangianfor the principal’s problem can be written as:
L(o,u,b,w,λ,η,µ) =










8The principal cannotimprove his proﬁtbyusing amoregeneral contract that distinguishes between
more levels of o, because, besides his effort level, the agent has no other private information.
8Proposition4. Intheoptimalsolutionto(5),boththeparticipationconstraintVo(o,u,b,w)≥
0andthe limitedliability constraint w ≥−L arebinding. Theoptimal effortlevels ˆ o and








u(u)=B −(1−λ) p(o,u) c′′
u(u) (7)
with 0<λ<1.
It is quite intuitivethat the principal will not give the agent a rent. Suppose the princi-
pal would choose some o and some b < B so that the agent gets a rent. The principal
could then increase observable effort and get a marginal beneﬁt of B −b while letting
the agent take the additional costs out of his rent. So the principal will transform the
agent’s rent into his own beneﬁt.
From (6) and (7) and 0 < λ < 1 we can conclude that c′
u(u) < B and c′
o(o) > B. This
impliesthat ˆ o >o∗ and ˆ u <u∗, so observable effort is above and unobservable effort is
below the ﬁrst-best level. We also note that ˆ o and ˆ u are not a cost-minimizing combi-
nation of efforts (because c′
o(ˆ o)  = c′
u( ˆ u)), meaning that p(ˆ o, ˆ u) could be produced less
costly by a different combination of efforts. It is also clear that ˆ o > obm, but we cannot
tell whether ˆ u is greater or smaller than ubm. In fact, numerical simulations show that
both cases can occur.
The principalis willing to set observable effort above theﬁrst-best level because stipu-
latingmoreobservableefforthastheadditionalbeneﬁtofinducingmoreunobservable
effort. Whenthe principaldemandsadditionalobservable effort, he mustcompensate
the agent for the additional cost (because the PC is binding), but does so by increasing
b, thereby increasing the agent’s incentive for providing unobservable effort. This can
bee seen if we combine the two implicit equations (6) and (7) by eliminating λ:
c′









Equation (8) can interpreted as the trade-off facing the principal at the margin when
he increases ˆ o beyond o∗. The term on the left-hand-side is the principal’s cost of in-
creasing observable effort further above the ﬁrst-best level. Because the PC is binding,
he has to compensate the agent for the marginal cost of additional effort but receives
additionalexpected beneﬁt of only B (which issmaller thanc′
o(o) because ˆ o >o∗). The
right hand side is his marginal beneﬁt and can be interpreted as follows (read from
right to left): if o is increased, the agent has marginal costs of c′
o(o) but receives a
marginal increase in expected payoff of only b. To compensate the agent for a small
9lossinpayoff, theprincipalhastomarginallyincreaseb by 1
p(o,u). Anmarginalincrease
in b will increase unobservable effort by 1
c′′
u(u), while a marginal increase in u will give
the principal an marginal beneﬁt of B −b. These effects can be labeled as follows:
c′
o(o)−B



























In our model, the agent’s limited liability causes a combination of the two kinds of ef-
fort that is not cost-minimizing,namely too much observable and too little unobserv-
ableeffort. ThissuggeststhatadecreaseinL –theproblemoflimitedliabilitybecomes
worse – will increase this distortion. The next propositionshows that thisis indeed the
case.
Proposition 5. If L decreases (the agent’s liability becomes more limited), ˆ o increases
and ˆ u decreases.
Thisresultlooksmoreobviousthanitis. BecauseifL decreases, itchangesnotonlythe
optimal combination of o and u that implements a given level of p(o,u) (substitution
effect), but it may also change the level of p(o,u) that is optimal for the principal to
implement (scale effect).9 Proposition 5 shows that the ﬁrst effect dominates. This
result also suggests a possible way to test our theory: for agents with a stricter liability
limit we should observe standards that prescribe a higher level of observable effort.
5. Conclusion
The paper analyzes a model of moral hazard with limited liability of the agent where
the agent’s effort has one observable and one unobservable dimension. For simplicity,
weonlyconsiderthecasewherethetwokindsofeffortsdonotinteractwitheachother.
We consider different contracts with regard to two questions: whether each of the two
kinds of effort is above or below its ﬁrst-best level and whether the two levels form a
cost-minimizing combination. With a contract that is conditional on outcome only,
both kinds of effort are below their ﬁrst-best levels but they form a cost-minimizing
combination. With a contract that is conditional on both outcome and observable
effort, unobservable effort will still be below its ﬁrst best level while observable effort
9The terminology is taken from Nagatani (1978). It can be shown that if L decreases, the substitution
effect is positive for o and negative for u. But if the optimal p(o,u) decreases, the scale effect will be
negative for both kinds of effort.
10will be above the ﬁrst-best level. This combination of efforts will not be cost-minimiz-
ing. The distortion between the two kinds of efforts increases if the agent’s liability
becomes more limited.
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Weﬁrstshowthatallb ≤0givetheprincipalthesameproﬁt. Iftheprincipalssetsb ≤0,
the agent will always choose o =0 and u =0, and w =0 will make the PC binding. This
will givethe principala proﬁt Π=0, for all b ≤0. Thusto show that b ≤0 is not optimal
it is sufﬁcient to show that b =0 is not optimal
We now show that for a given b ≥ 0 and w, the maximum of V (o,u,b,w) = bp(o,u)+
w −co(o)−cu(u) will be characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions b −c′
o(o) = 0 and
b−c′
u(u)=0. Because V (o,u,b,w) is strictly concave in o and u, an interior maximum
will be characterized by the ﬁrst-order conditions. As regards to corner solutions, o =
omax or u = umax cannot be a maximum because the costs would be inﬁnite, so zero
effort would be better. A possible corner solution with o = 0 and u = 0 would have
b−c′
o(0)≤0. Because ofb ≥0 andc′
o(0)=0 thisimpliesb =0 andthismaximumwould
also fulﬁll the ﬁrst-order condition with equality.
Now we show that b = 0 cannot be an optimum. Suppose otherwise: then the agent
would choose o = 0 and u = 0, and w = 0 would make the PC binding. If the principal























where the values of do
db and du
db come from implicitly differentiating the agent’s ﬁrst-







Proof of Proposition 2





















λ,η,µo,µu ≥0 (with complementaryslackness)
11It cannot be the case that both the PC and the LLC are slack. In this case, the principal
could always increase his proﬁt by decreasing w (formally, equation (14) can never be
fulﬁlled). Furthermore, it cannot be the case that the PC is binding and the LLC is not
binding: Because this would imply η = 0, and from (14) we would get λ = 1. Then (13)
and complementary slackness give us µo = 0,µu = 0 and from this we get o = o∗ and
u =u∗ (using equations (11) and (12)). But this contradicts Assumption7.















This implies b <B and µo, µu >0.
Forthissolutiontobeamaximum,theLagrangefunctionevaluatedwiththeLagrange-




which is concave in o, u, b and w (because c′′′
o (o),c′′′
u (u)>0).
Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst show that o = o by contradiction. Consider the case o < o. If the agent would
liketodisobeythecontract,hisoptimalchoiceofeffortsiso=0andu =0,whichwould
give him a payoff of −L < 0. But this cannot be optimal for the agent because obeying
and delivering o = o would give him a non-negative payoff (because the principal has
to fulﬁll the PC).
Now consider the case o > o. This would be optimal for the agent if the effort level
given by c′
o(o) =b is higher than o, or c′
o(o) <b. To show the opposite ﬁrst note that in
the principal’s optimum it must be the case that c′
o(o) ≥ B. If not, the principal could
marginally increase o while holding the agent’s payoff constant by increasing w. This
would increase the principal’s proﬁt marginally by B −c′
o(o) > 0. Second, it cannot be







which is negative for b > B. If the LLC is binding, this shows that decreasing b will



















u(u) whichisstillnegativeforb >B. So
we havec′
o(o)≥B andB ≥b which impliesc′
o(o)≥b which meansthat inthe optimum
o will be greater than the effort level implied by c′
o(o)=b.
We next show that all b ≤ 0 give the principal the same proﬁt. Suppose the principal
chooses some o ∈[0,omax] and sets b ≤0. Then the agent will choose u =0. For the PC
to hold the principal has to set w = −bo+co(o) > 0 ≥ −L. This will give him the same
proﬁt Π=Bo−co(o) for all b ≤0.
The proof that for all b ≥ 0 the optimal u will be given by the agent’s ﬁrst-order condi-
tion b−c′
u(u) = 0 is analogous to the argument in the proof of Proposition 1. Because
ˆ o >o∗ >0 we will also have p(o,u)>0.
Proof of Proposition 4
























λ,η,µ≥0 (with complementary slackness)
We show that a solution to these conditions must have both the PC and the LLC bind-
ing. If the PC is not binding, we will have λ = 0. Then (15) gives us b = B. But from
(17) we get µ = p(o,u) and plugging into (16) gives us b = B −p(o,u)c′′
u(u) < B, a con-
tradiction. If only the PC is binding but the LLC is not, we will have η=0. From (18) we
get λ= 1 and from (17) we get µ=0. Plugging into (15) and (16) gives us c′
o(o) =B and
c′
u(u) = B respectively. This implies, that the ﬁrst best can be achieved with a bonus
contract without violating the LLC. But this contradicts Assumption7.
From (18) we get λ = 1−η and with λ,η > 0, we must have 0 < λ < 1. From (17) we get
µ=(1−λ)p(o,u)>0. Substitutingfor µ into (16) and rearranging gives us
c′
u(u)=b =B −(1−λ) p(o,u) c′′
u(u)<B
and substitutingb =c′








multipliersfound above must be concave. This function is given by:
L ∗(o,u,b,w)=Bp(o,u)+(1−λ)L−λ[co(o)+cu(u)]−µc′
u(u)
which is concave in o, u, b and w (because c′′′
u (u)>0).
13Proof of Proposition 5
We have to show that do
dL <0 and du
dL >0. The optimal values for o,u,b and w are given
by the solution to the four equations:


























































We can now solve (24) for dw




dL. Plugging these results into














































































Because at the optimum c′
o > B > b, we will have e < 0, f > 0 and h > 0. To sign g, we










where the inequality follows again from c′
o >B >b. Because c′′
up(o,u) >0, this implies
c′′
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